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Abstract 
 
Shari’a commercial law is a complex system and covers numerous areas. Accordingly, only a selective and 
general overview can be given. This includes a look at some general principles, followed by an examination of 
some aspects that are characteristic of the regime, markedly different from those to which Western lawyers are 
accustomed, or both. In addition, it should be borne in mind that it is not possible to provide an account that is 
at the same time brief and wholly accurate. What follows, therefore, can be an approximation only.
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1. The Islamic attitude towards Commerce and Commercial Law 
 
Shari’a1 commercial law is a complex system and covers numerous areas. Accordingly, only a 
selective and general overview can be given, comprising a look at some general principles, followed 
by an examination of some aspects that are characteristic of the regime, or markedly different from 
those to which Western lawyers are accustomed, or both. In addition, it should be borne in mind that 
it is not possible to provide an account that is at the same time brief and wholly accurate. What 
follows, therefore, can only be an approximation. 
 
According to one author: ‘Islam is perhaps the one great religion which affords the merchant a 
highly honoured place in society’ (LIEBER, 1968, p. 230). According to another: 
 
There are religions whose sacred texts discourage economic activity in general, counselling their followers to 
rely on God to provide them with their daily bread, or, more particularly, looking askance at any striving for 
profit. This is certainly not the case with the Koran, which looks with favour upon commercial activity, 
confining itself to condemning fraudulent practices [...] It is reported that the Prophet said: […] ‘Merchants 
are the messengers of this world and God’s faithful trustees on Earth’ [...] Umar is alleged to have said: 
‘Death can come upon me nowhere more pleasantly than where I am engaged in business in the market, 
buying and selling on behalf of my family’ (RODINSON, 1987, pp. 70-71).2
 
One reason for this positive attitude may have been the Prophet’s merchant activities before his 
mission, another the social and economic importance of trade in the Muslim Middle East, 
particularly in desert areas in which additional sources of income were vital, yet another the 
involvement of jurists in trading activity -largely as investors (COHEN, 1970). 
 
 
2. General principles 
 
2.1. Generality and Specificity 
 
As in any commercial law regime, the foundation is the law of contract. Or, more accurately, the law 
of contracts, for, as in Roman law, the shari’a contained an array of contract types, the ‘nominate 
contracts’, each with its own rules. A list of some of the commonest varieties is unsurprising: 
 
- Sale (bai’) 
- Pledge (rahn) 
- Guarantee (kafala) 
- Agency (wakala) 
                                       
1 Transliteration of Arabic words has been simplified for ease of reading; the transliteration is not necessarily 
consistent. Thanks to Michael Foster Vander Elst for comments on a previous draft; the usual caveat applies. 
2 RODINSON also makes the point that Islam does not challenge private property. See also Koran 78:11. 
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- Hire (ijara) 
- Partnership (musharaka) 
- (Limited) partnership (mudaraba/qirad)3 
- Gift (hiba) 
 
It is of some interest to the comparatist that, as in civilian and unlike common law, the category of 
‘‘aqd’ (contract) includes both unilateral and synallagmatic relationships. Other contract types are 
more intriguing than those on the basic list, but since they evolved in accordance with/were 
recognised in response or as exceptions to the principles discussed below, they are not 
comprehensible without an understanding of those principles, and will not be mentioned here. 
 
The conclusion is often drawn from the existence of the nominate contracts that there is no general 
law of contract in the shari’a. In a sense, this is true. The jurists did not discourse about ‘contract’ in 
the same way that, for example, Treitel, Carbonnier or Gordley do. There was no ‘explicit general 
theory’ (HASSAN, 2002, p. 257). Discussions of ‘contract’ in modern books are often in fact discussions 
of sale. However, general principles do exist and it is these, and some of the consequences which 
flow from them, which we will look at in the following sections. 
 
The fundamental general principle is obedience to God, entailing the respect of the principles of 
Islam. So we see Islamic precepts, Islamic morality informing the rules in a detailed, substantive way 
which is quite different in nature from the general Christian background encountered in Western 
systems. 
 
2.2. Freedom of Contract4
 
The first, perhaps unexpected, consequence is the nominate contract system itself, which is 
intimately linked to the shari’a notion of freedom of contract. The latter is commonly misunderstood. 
The shari’a contains a principle of respect for the sanctity of contractual obligation. The Koran 5:1 
provides: ‘O ye who believe! Fulfil your undertakings’ (the word translated as ‘undertakings’ 
is ’uqud, which is the modern Arabic for ‘contracts’). This looks very much like pacta sunt servanda, 
and it is true that there are similarities between the two principles. In addition, what is not forbidden 
is allowed, a principle described by the jurist IBN TAYMIYAH: ‘men shall be permitted to make all the 
transactions they need, unless these transactions are forbidden by the Book or by the Sunna’ (IBN 
TAYMIYAH, 1948, p. 167). 
 
However, this does not mean that there is complete contractual autonomy. The Koranic injunction 
only applied to those obligations entered into pursuant to a recognised contract type that respected 
                                       
3 The term ‘commenda’ is quite often used as the equivalent of mudaraba/qirad. 
4 See Rayner, SE (1991) The Theory of Contracts in Islamic Law Graham & Trotman, Section 4.2; Saleh, N (2001) ‘Freedom 
of Contract: What Does it Mean in the Context of Arab Laws?’ (16) Arab Law Quarterly 346, pp 346-47. 
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the precepts of Islam. In other words, the Islamic nature of a contract is assured by its conforming to 
a type which has been verified as adhering to the requirements of religion. One can picture the 
nominate contracts as different types of electric light, determined in advance as providing an 
acceptable type of illumination. Parties are ‘free’ to turn on any of the light switches, but they cannot 
change the bulb or the wiring, nor can they construct new types. In other words, the nature and the 
essential terms of the particular contract are laid down in advance in order to ensure compliance 
with the shari’a. According to RAYNER (1991, p.91): ‘the parties to a private transaction are only free 
to determine the terms and object of their agreement subject to the strictures placed upon them by 
the Shari’a.’ And in Schacht’s words: ‘Islamic law does not recognise the liberty of contract, but it 
provides an appreciable measure of freedom within certain fixed types. Liberty of contract would be 
incompatible with the ethical control of legal transactions’ (SCHACHT, 1965, p. 144). 
 
2.3. Equity and Equality 
 
Other consequences of the fundamental principle in the field of contract law include the principles of 
equality and equity. The Koran 5:58 provides: ‘God doth command you to render back your Trusts to 
those to whom they are due; and when ye judge between man and man that ye judge with justice.’ A 
well-known Tradition has become a statement of principle: ‘There shall be no unfair loss nor the 
causing of such loss (la darar wa la dirar)’ (Islam, 1998, p. 340). 
 
These principles have various consequences in their turn. 
 
 
3. Extensions to the general principles 
 
3.1. Equilibrium 
 
Unlike English-based common law, for example, which does not recognise a principle of inequality 
of bargaining power, the shari’a ‘emphasises the idea of balance of counter values’ (ISLAM, 1998, 
p.341)5. 
 
3.2. Certainty of Contractual Obligation 
 
We have already seen that the shari’a contains a principle of the binding nature of the contract which 
is, however, subject to limitations set by the nature of the nominate contract system. It is also limited 
by notions of fairness. For example, the judge has considerable power to ‘reconstruct or readjust an 
existing contractual obligation’ (RAYNER, 1991, p. 93), notably to redress an imbalance of obligation 
                                       
5 On English law, see Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 326, Lord Denning’s unsuccessful attempt to import a 
principle of inequality of bargaining power into English law; for the reaction of his senior judicial colleagues, see Pao 
On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614, PC at 634-35 and National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan [1985] AC 686 at 707-08. 
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(istighlal). The schools differ here. The Hanafis and the Shafi’is require fraudulent imputation. The 
Malikis and Hanbalis apply the doctrine in the case of innocent or inexperienced victims of 
disproportionate contracts. A statutory enactment of the Maliki/Hanbali approach can be found in 
Art. 159 Kuwaiti Civil Code: 
 
“if [...] this contract contains gross inequities between the obligations to be executed and the spiritual or 
material profit to be gained, such that the ratification is plainly offensive to the honour of the transaction and 
to the requirement of good faith, then the judge shall be empowered [...] to reduce the obligations of the 
exploited party; or to increase the obligations of the other party; or to nullify the contract” (cited in RAYNER, 
1991, p. 225). 
 
Such judicial capacity to adjust the terms of the contract results in a level of uncertainty and a level of 
protection which are quite different from, say, that thought necessary in English-based common law. 
 
3.3. Certainty in Contract Formation 
 
The need for equality and equity results in a regime for the formation of contracts which is also 
markedly different from those found in Western systems, the idea being that the risk to the parties 
must be reduced to an acceptable minimum, notably by the provision of adequate information 
regarding all the relevant circumstances of the potential transaction. The contrast is stronger with the 
common law than with the civilian systems, but still present as regards the latter. Indeed, one can 
(very roughly) picture the three traditions as occupying different points on a spectrum of certainty, 
with English-based common law at one end (with minimal certainty requirements), civilian law 
somewhere in the middle, and the shari’a at the other end (with very high requirements). 
 
In this connection, the shari’a requires: 
 
- The contract to be made in an uninterrupted ‘contractual session’ (majlis al-’aqd) (ZYSOW, 
1985-86), a time when the parties are potentially leading up to a contract. If the session is 
interrupted, any acts that might have become legally significant are nullified, and another 
session must be started. 
 
- The asset to be certain in the sense that it must exist and must belong to the seller. It is not 
possible to sell an unborn foetus or a fish that has not yet been caught (there are special types 
of contract for the future provision and the manufacture of goods, called respectively salam 
and istisna’). 
 
- The asset to be precisely described at the time of the contract both in terms of its physical 
appearance, its type, its quality and its value. So ‘I am selling you a ewe from this flock’ is not 
valid (COMAIR-OBEID, 1996, p. 27). 
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- The price to be fixed at the time of the contract. 
 
3.4. The Prohibition of Gharar 
 
What has been expressed here as a certainty requirement is closely linked to, indeed largely overlaps 
with, another general rule deriving from the need for equity and equality, the prohibition of gharar 
(SALEH, 1992; BUANG, 2000; EL-GAMAL, 2000). Roughly speaking, gharar denotes excessive risk, but 
any attempted translation would be misleading, so the Arabic word will be used herein (ZAHRAA 
and MAHMOR, 2002). 
 
The relationship of the prohibition to what has just been discussed is indicated by Comair-Obeid: 
‘Transactions comprising an element of uncertainty relating to the object of sale, its price, or the 
delay allowed for delivery of the goods, are considered by the moralists to be tainted by gharar (risk 
uncertainty, speculation) and so to be prohibited by shari’a’ (Comair-Obeid, 1996, p. 57). However, 
gharar is broader than uncertainty, it covers all kinds of undue risk. So derivatives transactions, for 
example, are tainted by gharar. The prohibition is linked to the prohibition of gambling (maysir) in 
the Koran 2:219, and the Koranic injunctions 5:93 in that regard are often viewed as its legal source 
(the word gharar is not itself mentioned), but the rules were in fact largely developed by the jurists 
on the basis of Traditions. 
 
The effect of the prohibition of gharar is perhaps most strikingly seen in the development of Islamic 
insurance (takaful)6. The degree of risk inherent in a Western contract of insurance is considered to be 
unacceptable by Sunni jurists (Shi’a jurists allow it), so a structure is used which resemble Western 
mutual insurance, effectively pooling monies using a system of joint guarantees (BILLAH, 1998 and 
2003). 
 
3.5. The Prohibition of Riba 
 
By far the most well known rule is the prohibition of riba. It has been described as ‘unlawful excess or 
deferment’ (SALEH, 2001, p.353). Commonly translated, and treated, as ‘interest’, in fact riba is much 
wider than that; even if there is a clear consensus that interest is included in riba. The prohibition 
seems to have started life as a ban on interest, was extended to barter, and then was enlarged to 
cover ‘all transactions involving the exchange of counter-values’ (SALEH, 2001, p.353). The 
prohibition is mentioned on several occasions in the Koran (2:275, 2: 278 and 4:161).7 A longer 
description is that riba is: 
                                       
6 It also seems to contravene the prohibition of riba, as an insurance policy provides for predetermined returns to the 
insurance company. 
7 See also the Last Sermon of the Prophet: ‘“Every form of interest (Riba) is cancelled; capital indeed is yours which 
you shall have; wrong not and you shall not be wronged. Allah has given His Commandment totally prohibiting 
interest (Riba). I start with the amount of interest which people owe to Abbas and declare it all cancelled”. He then, on 
 7
InDret 1/2007  Nicholas HD Foster 
 
An unlawful gain derived from the quantitative inequality of the counter values in any transaction 
purporting to effect the exchange of two or more species […] which belong to the same genus, and are 
governed by the same efficient cause. Deferred completion of the exchange of such species, or even of species 
which belong to different genera but are governed by the same (efficient cause) is also riba, whether or not 
the deferment is accompanied by an increase in any one of the exchanged counter values (Saleh, 1986, pp. 12-
13). 
 
Professor Mohammed, after citing this passage, writes that: 
 
Usurious transactions were classified by the jurists into two classes: (1) riba al-fadl, which produced 
unlawful excess in exchange of counter values in a contemporaneous transaction and (2) riba al-nasi’a, 
which produced unlawful gain by deferring the completion of exchange of countervalues, with or 
without an increase in profit. A third category was also added by some scholars called riba al-jahiliyya 
or pre-Islamic riba exemplified by the lender asking the borrower at maturity date if he will settle the 
debt or increase it. Increase occurred by charging interest on the debt initially accrued. 
 
Riba al-Jahilya [sic] relates to pre-Islamic riba also described as usury. But riba al-fadl and riba    al-nasi’a 
apply to the exchange (whether concurrent or deferred) of two precious metals (gold or silver) and 
four commodities (wheat, barley, dates and salt). The application of the doctrine of riba to these 
articles is based on the Prophet’s tradition. It was further extended by analogy (qiyas), to the products 
of these six articles if their present or future exchange could have the smell or taint of riba.8
 
The reasons behind the prohibition are commonly stated to be: (i) the protection of the 
disadvantaged from exploitation by the wealthy and knowledgeable; (ii) the corrupting effect on the 
lender of making money from money, rather than from honest toil; and (iii) the Islamic contention 
that money is solely a means of exchange, not a commodity. Explanations (i) and (ii) seem plausible 
as regards riba al-jahiliyya and many instances of riba al-fadl, but are less satisfactory, and somewhat 
controversial, in the case of the exchange of commodities and riba al-nasi’a. A strict application of the 
rule results, for example, in jewellers being unable to charge for their labour, as they must sell by 
weight (RAYNER, 1991, p. 272)9. Despite the consensus of Islamic jurists to the contrary, the minority 
                                                                                                                           
behalf of his uncle, Abbas, cancelled the total amount of interest due on his loan capital from his debtor.’ Cited in 
Mahmood-ur-Rahman Faisal and Others v Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Government of 
Pakistan and Others PLD [1992] FSC 1 at 70-71. 
8 Mohammed ‘Principles of Islamic Contract Law’, p 119. On origins, see Yanagihashi, H (2004) A History of the Early 
Islamic Law of Property: Reconstructing the Legal Development, 7th-9th Centuries Brill, Chapter 3. 
9 Professor EL-GAMAL (2000, pp. 2-4) argues that ‘the prohibition of Riba cannot be fully explained by a simple appeal 
to exploitation of the poor’ and that the words used in the Koranic verse cited in support of this explanation have 
been misinterpreted. He also writes that ‘classical jurists of all major schools’ did accept the notion of a time value of 
money. His explanation is founded on the idea of fair compensation and the discounting of losses and gains. The most 
detailed examination of the historical origin of riba is contained in Yanagihashi A History of the Early Islamic Law of 
Property, Chapter 3, see particularly the summary of conclusions, pp 294-97. The author argues that the various types 
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opinion that a reasonable rate of simple interest is acceptable has been enacted into the legislation of 
many states. One example is Art 399 UAE Commercial Code.10
 
Whenever the shari’a is mentioned in a commercial context, the immediate reaction of the newcomer 
to the field is something along the lines of: ‘Oh, they don’t allow interest, do they.’ The implication is 
that this is the only relevant difference between the shari’a and other, particularly Western, 
commercial legal regimes. 
 
It should be clear even from the brief introduction herein that there is far more to the study of shari’a 
commercial law than that. Riba itself is not just interest, it is a far-reaching, controversial and 
complex topic; and the particularities of shari’a commercial law go far beyond the prohibition of riba. 
 
3.6. Ancillary Conditions 
 
A rule that strikes the modern lawyer as strange is that relating to the number of conditions in the 
contract. A contract should have only one condition, for example the sale of an object. In principle, 
no other provisions (‘ancillary conditions’) are allowed, because more conditions upset the balance of 
benefits between parties (RAYNER, 1991, p. 305-351; COULSON, 1984, pp. 56-74). The following 
prophetic Tradition is quoted in this regard: 
 
What do they think of, those men who lay down conditions not to be found in the Book of God? Any 
stipulation not to be found in the Book of God is null and void. Were there a hundred such conditions of this 
sort, the one rule of God will be more equitable and surer (COMAIR-OBEID, 1996, p. 32). 
 
COMAIR-OBEID explains the reasoning thus: 
 
Allowing individuals to freely arrange the effects of their juridical acts according to their whims brings the 
risk of their committing abuses by perpetuating aleatory contracts […] This will have the effect of an 
imbalance of the benefits of the contracting parties, evidently going against the principles of equity and 
justice that the Koran […] and the sunna of the Prophet have laid down for the contract to be concluded with 
concern for the perfect equilibrium of the reciprocal advantages (COMAIR-OBEID, 1996, pp. 32-33). 
 
Natural and essential ancillary conditions are allowed such as a condition allowed for down 
payment if the price is not to be paid immediately. A lender can require a pledge or a guarantee. 
Other ancillary conditions are invalid. So a condition that the seller may keep the article for a week 
after the sale is ineffective. However, the madhahib diverge. For Zahiris, the ban is total, it is only 
                                                                                                                           
of riba were introduced for various historical reasons, including resistance to exploitation by the Umayyad regime of 
its monetary reforms, attempts to deal with problems arising from the insolvency of buyers, and share-cropping 
contracts. 
10 On minority opinions to this effect, see EL-GAMAL ‘“Interest” and the Paradox of Contemporary Islamic Law and 
Finance’, pp 109-10. 
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partial in the Hanafi, Shafi’i and Maliki schools, the Hanbalis allow them within the limits of shari’a 
morality. 
 
The modern legislator has adopted the Hanbali position in order to accommodate commercial 
practice. 
 
 
4. Options 
 
This regime has been described as ‘perhaps one of the most complex areas of Islamic law’, but also as 
‘dominant and crucial for the study of the sale contract’ (RAYNER, 1991, ch. 7; the option of the majlis 
-khiyar al-majlis- is not dealt with here: see id, pp 109-10; MALLAT, 2000, p. 94). As will be seen in the 
conclusion section, various issues arise in this area of considerable interest to the legal historian and 
the comparatist. 
 
The rules give the parties to the contract various options. In Rayner’s words: ‘If the option is to 
cancel, the effect is to render the situation as if the contract had never existed, although these acts are 
not void ab initio as in the case of contracts tainted with nullity. The Fuqaha simply categorised them 
as valid legal acts subject to ratification’ (RAYNER, 1991, p. 305). 
 
The options are of two main types: those that arise by the will of one party (which one can therefore 
designate as ‘expressed’), and those that arise by operation of law (which one can designate as 
‘automatic’). 
 
The expressed options are the option of condition (khiyar al-shart) and the option of designation 
(khiyar at-tay’in). 
 
4.1. Expressed Options 
 
a) Option of Condition 
 
Either party is allowed a period during which he or she may annul the contract (Mallat, 2000, pp. 
309-319). The length of the period varies according to the madhhab. The option must be declared 
either during contracting or just afterwards. It is a clear example of the law ensuring that parties 
contract with full information, protecting them from hasty decisions. 
 
As an aside, its existence accounts for the apparently rigid, and otherwise difficult to understand, 
attitude of the shari’a to fraud and error. These topics are not of particular importance, because the 
party has already had the opportunity to consider and, if he or she thinks it best, to annul, the 
transaction. The Hanbali and Shafi’i madhahib also recognised the option of the session (khiyar al-
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majlis), which allows one of the parties to rescind a formed contract while the parties are still in 
session. It is not recognised by the Malikis and the Hanafis (SALEH, 2001, p. 348). 
 
b) Option of Designation 
 
The buyer may designate one of several objects offered for a fixed price. Effectively, once the parties 
agree, suspended contracts are made. When the buyer makes the designation, one suspended 
contract comes into force, the other suspended contracts are regarded as never having existed. This 
option protects the inexperienced party, allowing him or her time to choose the article best suited to 
them (RAYNER, 1991, p. 319-326). 
 
4.2. Options Arising by Operation of Law 
 
Many exist, but only two need be mentioned here: 
 
a) Option of Defect (khiyar al-’ayb/khiyar al-naqisa) 
 
If the purchaser finds a defect in the object of the sale transaction, he or she has the option of 
cancelling the contract (SALEH, 2001, pp. 327-343). The option is based on two prophetic Traditions: 
‘A Muslim is not allowed to sell his brother anything with a defect unless he points it out to him.’ 
‘He who deceives us is not one of ours’ (COMAIR-OBEID, 1996, p. 82). The jurists developed a set of 
rules concerning degrees of defect in order to preserve equity between parties.  
 
Four conditions are necessary for the option to be exercisable. The defect must: exist before the sale; 
still exist when the buyer cancels contract; not be known to the buyer when he/she took possession; 
and not be subject to an exclusion clause (such clauses are not permitted by some schools). 
 
b) Option of Inspection (khiyar ar-ru’ya) 
 
Strictly speaking, an option of inspection should not be necessary, as the sale of something not 
present does not concord with the requirement of certainty. However, exceptions to the rule did 
occur in practice. Therefore the schools differ concerning this option. The Hanbalis admit it as legal. 
The Malikis require it to be expressed by the party wishing to benefit from it; if the object is not 
defined, the option is not valid and the contract is binding. The Shafi’i position varied. They used to 
reject it categorically, but in modern times they taken a stance similar to that of the Hanafis, who 
allow it, on the basis that it prevents gharar (RAYNER, 1991, p. 343-351). 
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4.3. Force Majeure 
 
Force majeure (quwat al-qanun) is widely defined, far more widely than in English-based common 
law (COMAIR-OBEID, 1996, ch. 6.6). In addition to dealing with impossibility of performance, it also 
covers circumstances in which performance has become materially different from that contracted for. 
‘[A]ny contract should cease to bind when: 
 
- A wholly unforeseen fundamental change has occurred in events; 
 
- The contract has become especially onerous on the obliging party as a result; 
 
- There is a requisite duty to impose a just and reasonable solution’ (COMAIR-OBEID, 1996, ch. 
6.6). 
 
So ‘a contractor in a Muslim jurisdiction hired under a contract of service to dig a well may rescind 
the contract should he strike rock after the first few feet of digging’ (COMAIR-OBEID, 1996, p. 260).  
 
 
5. Legality of Cause, Object and Consideration 
 
The need to respect the precepts of Islam also results in rules concerning the cause (sabab) of the 
contract, as well as assets that are its objects and the consideration payable in respect of them. 
 
5.1. Legality of Cause 
 
The underlying cause must be lawful. A useful definition of cause can be found in Art 207(1) UAE 
Civil Code: the ‘direct purpose aimed at by the contract’. So a contract to buy grapes is invalid if the 
underlying cause of entering into the transaction is to make wine. 
 
5.2. Legality of Object 
 
The object of the contract must be legal (mubah), ie: 
 
- Beneficial; examples of assets which are not beneficial include vermin and animals not useful 
for hunting; 
 
- Capable of being traded; examples of assets not in this category include public property (a 
mosque, or assets subject to a waqf), and birds not yet caught; 
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- Capable of being delivered; an asset not capable of being delivered is a beam in the roof of a 
house which cannot be removed without harming its structure; 
 
- Lawful; wine, pork, blood and idols are examples of forbidden commodities (most schools 
prohibit the sale of dogs, apart from hunting dogs). 
 
5.3. Legality of Consideration 
 
The consideration must also be legal. For example, one cannot pay for goods with wine. 
 
5.4. Necessity and Exceptions 
 
The strict application of some of the above rules would cripple commerce. Therefore some notable 
exceptions were allowed, on the basis of the overriding principle of necessity (darura). Salam and 
istisna’ have already been briefly mentioned. Salam ‘involves purchase of a fungible good, described 
precisely, for delivery at a specified future time against full payment at the time the contract is 
entered into. The good does not have to exist at the time of the contract’ (VOGEL and HAYES, 1998, p. 
249; YANAGIHASHI, 2004, pp. 163-209). It is ‘an exception to the rule that prohibits someone from 
selling an object that does not belong to him’ (YANAGIHASHI, 2004, p. 165). Istisna’, regarded by some 
jurists as a sub-category of salam, is a contract of manufacture. One example is the contract entered 
into by an artisan and his customer to make a shoe from leather in the artisan’s possession (RAYNER, 
1991, p. 137-138). 
 
5.5. Good Faith 
 
The numerous references above to such notions as equity and equality may well have raised a 
question in the Western lawyer’s mind: What about good faith? Good faith is the concept which is 
used par excellence in civilian systems to ensure that justice is done, that the need for certainty and 
efficiency in law does not override the need for fairness.11
 
The Koran 2:224-25, 5:89 and 83:1-5 clearly enjoins honest and fair dealing: 
 
- And do not allow your oaths in the name of God [frequently and hastily pronounced to thus] 
become an obstacle to acts of virtue and righteousness and reconciliation of people; surely 
God is All-hearing, All-knowing. God will not hold against you a slip in your oaths, but He 
will hold you responsible [only] for what your hearts have earned [intentionally] and God is 
All-forgiving, Forbearing. 
 
                                       
11 The Koranic references and the Traditions cited in this section come from Akaddaf ‘Application of the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) to Arab Islamic Countries’, pp 31-34. 
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- God will not hold against you [an unintentional] slip in your oaths; but He will [only] hold 
you responsible for such oaths, which you have earnestly.  
 
- Woe to the fraudulent dealers, who exact full measure from others, but give less than due to 
others in weight and measure, do they not know that they will be called to account, on a 
mighty day. 
 
As far as Traditions are concerned, it is recounted that the Prophet said: ‘Abu Sayed reported that the 
Messenger of Allah said: the truthful trustworthy merchant will be with the Prophets, truthful and 
martyrs.12 ‘The merchants will be gathered on the Resurrection day as transgressors except those 
who were fearful of Allah, pious and truthful.’ More specifically, there is a duty to disclose defects in 
sales: ‘Uqba bin Amir said: It is illegal for one to sell a thing if one knows that it has a defect, unless 
one inform the buyer of that defect.’13
 
We might therefore conclude that the shari’a contains a duty of good faith. This is not entirely 
wrong, but it is misleading unless carefully qualified and viewed in a way which takes the different 
context into account. ‘Good faith’ is a culturally rooted concept which derives from a Western 
tradition in which ‘hard’ certainty can be counterbalanced on occasion by ‘soft’ or ‘fuzzy’ justice, in 
which certainty is given primacy because it leads to economic efficiency over a sense of morality only 
tenuously linked to religion.14 In the commercial shari’a, economic efficiency has to be viewed in the 
context of religious values, one of which is fair dealing. Those values inform the entire system, 
generating rules intended to lead to a fair result, so there is no need for a concept to remedy 
harshness, no explicitly enunciated principle of good faith.15 It is much more accurate, therefore to 
view all principles and rules which deal with issues relevant to morality, in other words all 
principles and rules discussed so far, as the material to be compared with Western ‘good faith’, not 
just material such the Koranic verses and Traditions set out above which, to a lawyer with a Western 
mindset, seems to be the most appropriate for such comparison. 
 
 
 
 
                                       
12 Mishkatul Masabih, Kitab al-Buyu, Karim, al-Haj Maulana Abdul, (trans), Book II, no 4, p 269, cited in Billah, M 
‘Regulatory Framework of Doctrine of “Utmost Good Faith” In Takaful (Islamic Insurance)’, available at: 
Hhttp://www.icmif.org/2k4takaful/site/documents/Good%20Faith%20in%20Takaful.docH. 
13 Cited in Akaddaf ‘Application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) to Arab Islamic Countries’, pp 33. 
14 But note the difference between the attitude of English common law concerning transactions between commercial 
parties, in which economic efficiency is paramount and civilian law that is more influenced by ideas of fairness.  
15 An intriguing instance of the influence of European law on the enacted shari’a is to be found in Art 159 Kuwaiti 
Civil Code quoted above, which specifically mentions good faith: ‘if […] ratification is plainly offensive to the honour 
of the transaction and to the requirement of good faith’ (emphasis added.) 
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6. The Practical Side 
 
This conclusion has far-reaching consequences for those areas of practice for which the shari’a is 
relevant, such as Islamic finance and the Islamically-grounded law of some Muslim-majority 
jurisdictions. The danger of the attitude just described is that it leads to the Pooh Bear phenomenon. 
Pooh Bear is well intentioned, but not well informed, and the successful results he obtains derive 
more from luck than judgment. 
 
6.1. The ‘Enacted Shari’a’ 
 
Let us take the example of the hawala in the ‘enacted shari’a’. Recall the difficulties associated with 
ascertaining exactly what the shari’a was and how it functioned. These difficulties result in a 
situation in which one cannot be sure that the rules and mechanisms are employed in the ‘correct’ 
way, ie as they were in the classical period. Moreover, even when knowledge of the law in action is 
theoretically available, it is found in academic publications that will in all probability not be read by 
those responsible for the state of the law as practised. 
 
As stated above, the basic function of the hawala was to transfer obligations. It then developed in 
different ways in different madhahib. In most (the Hanafis had different rules) it could only be used 
to transfer rights where the transferor was using it to satisfy an obligation owed by him to a third 
party.16 It was enacted into the UAE Civil Code in this form (Arts 1106–1132). However, the 
Islamically conservative Abu Dhabi Supreme Court, despite the presumably intentional omission of 
a Western-style transfer of rights, nonetheless found that UAE law allowed such transfers (FOSTER, 
2004). The result may well be attributable to the civilian law mindset of the judges, all of whom were 
Egyptian, and who were therefore trained in an environment in which such transfers are normal (see 
Arts. 303 and 315 Egyptian Civil Code). 
 
Does this matter? If the law works, especially in such a technical area, should one care what it was in 
the past? The answer to this question depends on the aims which one wishes to achieve. The main 
two goals seem to be (i) to ‘return’ to the shari’a, which might imply that one should recreate it in as 
historically authentic a way as possible; and (ii) to establish a religiously appropriate law. There may 
be a conflict between these aims, since historically well-attested mechanisms such as the hiyal 
(fictions or stratagems, devices which respect the letter but not the spirit of the law) are now viewed 
as dubious at least. Should they be part of the modern shari’a? We return to the problem of 
differences between the madhahib (the hiyal were largely a Hanafi phenomenon), the authority to 
determine what the shari’a is/should be, and so forth. 
 
 
                                       
16 See Foster, NHD (2003-2004) ‘Owing and Owning in Islamic and Western Law’ in Cotran E and Lau M (eds) 
Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law Vol 10 Brill, pp 87-88. 
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6.2. Islamic Finance Law 
 
The same considerations arise in Islamic finance law, but are manifested in different ways and in 
different fora. 
 
A recent Malaysian case, Affin Bank Berhad v Zulkifli Abdullah,17 has highlighted the problem of 
adaptation to the modern world. An ‘Islamic mortgage’ (Al-Bai Bithaman Ajil). In this type of 
transaction, A wishes to buy Blackacre for $100; Bank buys Blackacre for $100; Bank sells Blackacre to 
A for $150, payable over 20 years. In the instant case, the purchaser defaulted early in the term, but 
the bank claimed the entire amount. PATAIL J refused to enforce the contract as drafted on the 
ground that it caused injustice to the purchaser. The judgment has created a considerable stir, with 
some people viewing it as illegitimate interference by a secular court with an Islamic transaction. The 
better view, it is submitted, is that the judgment is no more than a necessary step in the development 
of a new system, a development necessitated by the 19th century decision to adopt/imposition of 
Western law in preference to the adaptation of the shari’a. 
 
More generally, the judgment raises the general issue of the best way to develop Islamic finance law. 
Should one adapt the nominate contracts, as has been done so far, or should one strike out beyond 
them on the basis of general shari’a principles? (EL-GAMAL, 2005, p. 127).18
 
 
7. The Intellectual Side 
 
On an intellectual level, there is much to be gained from the study of the subject. For the comparatist 
and the legal historian, for example, there are many issues of considerable interest. 
 
One example, already mentioned, is the substantially non-state nature of the system, relevant to 
contemporary discussions concerning such phenomena as the modern lex mercatoria. 
                                       
17 [2006] 1 Current Law Journal 438, Kuala Lumpur High Court, Commercial Division, Bernama, December 29, 2005. 
Summary available at: Hhttp://www.malaysianbar.org.my/content/view/2174/2/H (last visited 23 August 2006). 
The case is to be the subject of a study by Dr Ahmad Hidayat Buang, Department of Shari’ah and Law, Academy of 
Islamic Studies, University of Malaya. Many thanks to Dr Buang for bringing it to the author’s attention and for 
allowing sight of the draft paper. It is also discussed in Hassan, MH and Daud, MH (2006) ‘Bank’s Claim in a Bai 
Bithaman Ajil Facility: The Flaws of the Affin Bank Case: A Commentary on Affin Bank Berhad v Zulkifli Bin Abdullah’ 
(3) Islamic Finance News and Foster, NHD (Forthcoming) ‘Encounters between Legal Systems: Recent Cases concerning 
Islamic Commercial Law in Secular Courts’ Amicus Curiae. 
18 Contra: ‘An appeal to maqasid al-shari’a (objectives of shari’a) is not as easy as it may initially seem to the 
uninitiated. It involves an understanding of Islam as a way of life, a process of social reconstruction, and a mission 
with humanity—an understanding far deeper than what one would normally expect from a contemporary legal 
expert.’ Siddiqi, MN (2005) ‘Social Dynamics of the Debate on Default in Payment and Sale of Debt’ in Ali Islamic 
Finance: Current Legal and Regulatory Issues, p 116. 
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Another intriguing topic is the apparent parallel evolution of terms imposed by law on the 
contracting parties to protect the weaker person. The underlying similarity of legal thinking between 
the options and English common law’s implied terms and some aspects of modern consumer 
legislation is uncanny, even taking into account the inevitable differences between the two systems. 
 
A third example is the comparative analysis of the rules deriving from the principles of equity and 
equality with the Western notion of good faith. It is a classic example of the need to look beyond 
appearances. The fact that there is no equivalent to the good faith principle does not necessarily 
mean that there is no good faith in the system. As we have just seen, in the case of the shari’a the 
opposite is the case. The apparent absence of the principle indicates that it is omnipresent. In 
addition, consideration of this part of the subject raises questions about the comparability of legal 
systems based on different sets of values. One cannot compare them on the basis of efficiency, for 
instance, without committing the error of trying to measure incommensurables against a standard 
only applicable to one system. It is impossible to say which is ‘better’, as there is no tertium 
comparationis, no common standard against which the two systems may be assessed. Western 
commercial regimes can be compared as among themselves, as they all aspire to efficiency, but the 
shari’a aspires primarily to respect for Islam.19
 
Finally, consider the rewards that derive from a comparative study of riba/gharar and the 
equivalent attitudes in Western system. Most people new to the topic automatically assume that 
interest and speculation are normal, even ‘natural’ and that the Islamic prohibitions are therefore 
strange. At the very least, it is assumed that the approval of interest and speculation is typical of 
Western culture, and that the shari’a prohibition is typical of Islam. This is untrue. The Bible forbids 
interest, as does Jewish law (between Jews).20 Money has been seen as sterile for thousands of years, 
a viewpoint repeated and given additional force by Aristotle: ‘The most hated sort (of wealth getting) 
and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself and not from the 
natural object of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange but not to increase at interest.’21 
The Catholic Church outlawed it, declaring in 1311 that secular laws allowing it were void. The ban 
was only lifted in Europe at a relatively late date. It is European Christians, therefore, who departed 
from the common tradition, so it is just as legitimate to view Western attitudes as ‘strange’ as the 
reverse. 
 
                                       
19 For examples of this sort of comparison taken to the extent of numbers and tables, or ‘leximetrics’, see Siems, MM 
(2005) ‘What Does Not Work in Comparing Securities Laws: A Critique on La Porta et al’s Methodology’ (16) 
International Company and Commercial Law Review 300. 
20 See, eg, Exodus: 22:25; Ezekiel: 18:8; Luke 6:34; although it must be added that there is a way around the prohibition 
in Jewish law. For accounts of the history, see Ireland, P ‘Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership’, 
(1999) 62 Modern Law Review 32, pp 34-38 and Zarlenga, S (1999) ‘A Brief History of Interest’, available at 
Hhttp://www.monetary.org/interest.htmH. 
21 Politics, 1258b quoted in Zarlenga ‘A Brief History of Interest’. 
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More generally, it is this author’s experience that a study of the shari’a is often the turning point for 
students of comparative law. Divergences between the civilian and the common law traditions are 
interesting, but are not so striking as to convince them that differences between legal systems can be 
fundamental. The shari’a, though, allows the student to grasp this fact. In addition, the numerous 
similarities of legal thought and legal rule teach another valuable lesson, the role of the mediation of 
difference and similarity in comparative legal studies. 
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